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STATUTORILY BASED FEDERAL RIGHTS:
A NEW ROLE FOR SECTION 1983
INTRODUCTION

Section 19831 of the Civil Rights Act 2 provides the cause of
action by which individuals may seek relief from state infringement of rights secured by the federal constitution and federal
laws. Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
have altered both the scope of section 1983, and the manner in
which actions may be brought. In order to fully understand
these changes, and their future impact on causes of action under
section 1983, a brief overview of the statute's history and a discussion of recent developments are necessary.
HistoricalBackground
On April 20, 1871, Congress enacted a law "to enforce the
'3
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, the major purpose of the law
was to prevent the deprivation of constitutional rights at a time
when the southern states under Reconstruction were unwilling
or unable to stem the growing violence directed against the
4
freedmen.
Four years later, when Congress revised and consolidated
existing federal statutes into various titles, the 1871 Act was divided into a substantive portion, the predecessor of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,5 and a jurisdictional portion, now codified at 28 U.S.C.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
2. Statutes pertaining to civil rights are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 19812000(h) (1976).
3. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. Now referred to as the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, its original, formal title was "An Act to enforce the
Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and for other Purposes."
4. The historical background of the Ku Klux Klan Act and its early development are extensively treated in two excellent articles, Gressman, The
Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323 (1952);

Note, Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HAnv. L.
REV. 1133 (1977).
5. The original codification, 18 Stat. § 1979 (1875), provided for a cause
of action in terms identical to the present § 1983.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
547

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 14:547

§ 1343(3).6 In the process of codification and consolidation, the
wording of the original Act was changed. The words "and laws"
were added, thus making the substantive section applicable on
its face to violations not only of the Constitution, but of a right
created by any federal statute. 7 The jurisdictional section retained the historical restriction, limiting its scope to laws providing for equal rights.8 The difference created complicates the
interpretation of both statutes. 9
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
6. The original codification was contained in two separate sections. In
1875, both the circuit and district courts were courts of original jurisdiction.
See 18 Stat. §§ 563 (12), 629 (16) (1875). The jurisdiction of circuit and district
courts was merged in 1911, adopting the language of § 629(16). Act of March
3,1911, § 24 (Fourteenth), 36 Stat. 1092. The consolidation became the present § 1343(3).
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) to redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of
Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States....
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1957).
7. Justice Powell suggested that the phrase might logically be interpreted to mean a right secured by both the Constitution and the laws of the
United States. He reasoned that, otherwise, the statute would read "Constitution or laws." He cited as examples 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides federal jurisdiction over matters arising "under the Constitution or laws," and
18 U.S.C. § 241, which creates criminal penalties for conspiracy to deprive
persons of rights secured by "the Constitution or laws." Maine v. Thiboutot,
100 S.Ct. 2502, 2508 n.1 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
8. Rev. Stat. § 1979 referred to rights "secured by the Constitution of
the United States or ... by any law of the United States;" § 629 (16) referred to rights secured "by the Constitution of the United States or ... by
any law providing for equal rights of citizens of the United States." 36 Stat.
1092, which consolidated §§ 563(12) and 629(16), adopted the narrow language of § 629(16).
9. Throughout the several years that it took to prepare the Revised
Statutes, various members of the committee charged with the task of codifying the Statutes at Large insisted that no substantive changes would be
made. See, e.g., 2 CONG. REc. 646 (1874) (remarks of Rep. Poland) ("there
shall be nothing omitted and nothing changed"); 2 CONG. REc. 4220 (1874)
(remarks of Sen. Conkling) ("[tJhe aim throughout has been to preserve
absolute identity of meaning, not to change the law in any particular").
While the Supreme Court has admonished that "an insertion [of language]
in the Revised Statutes .. .is not lightly to be read as making a change
....
United States v. Sischo, 262 U.S. 165, 168-69 (1923), it has also decided
that the "customary stout assertions of the codifiers that they had merely
clarified and reorganized without changing substance should not be taken
at face value." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 803 (1966). Cf. United
States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 74 (1951) ('The dominant conditions of the
Reconstruction Period were not conducive to the enactment of carefully
considered and coherent legislation. Strong post-war feelings caused inad-

1981]

Statutorily Based Federal Rights

Claims brought under section 1983 were rare' 0 until the
emergence of the Civil Rights Movement." This era saw an expansion of the scope of section 1983 to encompass claims arising
under constitutional provisions other than the fourteenth
amendment. 12 Decisions before 1950 assumed, sub silentio, that
jurisdiction for these claims was provided by section 1343(3).
No discussion of the relationship between the two sections was
3
necessary, as all of the claims alleged constitutional violations.'
Subsequently, in Bomar v. Keyes, 14 the Second Circuit held
that a purely statutory claim might be brought under section
1983.15 No authority for this view was cited and the jurisdictional problem was ignored. The issue did not arise again with
equate deliberation and led to loose and careless phrasing of laws related to
the new political issues.").
10. In the first fifty years after its enactment, only 21 cases were decided
under § 1983. Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate
Federal Civil Remedy?, X26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951). In 1960, 280 suits were
filed under all of the civil rights acts combined. Note, Developments in the
Law: Section 1983 and Federalism,90 HARv. L. REV. 1133, 1172 (1977). See
generally Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. REV.
1286 (1953).
11. By 1972, approximately eight thousand suits were filed annually
under § 1983 alone. McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983, 60 VA. L.
REV. 1, 1 n.2 (1974). By 1977, the number had topped thirteen thousand,
where it has remained. (This number does not include prisoner petitions
filed under § 1983). Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2515 n.16 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
12. Early decisions limited § 1983 to statutory and constitutional claims
related to racial discrimination. This restriction explained the rejection of
three suits involving alleged violations of the contracts clause that "[n]o
State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ... ." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68
(1900); Pleasants v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 323 (1884); Carter v. Greenhow, 114
U.S. 317 (1883). The Supreme Court has since abandoned this view, and it
has also expanded the application of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g.,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (prohibiting state residence requirement for welfare eligibility); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)
(wrongful death recovery rights for illegitimate children); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (prohibiting sterilization of persons convicted
more than twice of felonies involving moral turpitude). Section 1983 claims
have also been allowed in cases involving other constitutional violations.
See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (fourth amendment); Douglas
v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) (first amendment); Hague v. CIO,
307 U.S. 496 (1938) (first amendment).
13. See generally Note, The Proprietyof Granting a FederalHearingfor
Statutorily Based Actions Under the Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Acts:
Blue v. Craig, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343 (1975).
14. 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947).
15. In Bomar, a public school teacher discharged because of absences
due to federal jury service brought suit under § 1983, claiming violation of
her statutory right to serve on a jury. In concluding that the complaint
stated a claim under § 1983, Judge Learned Hand found no case "in which
the right or privilege at stake was secured by a 'law' of the United States."
162 F.2d at 139. The jurisdictional problem posed by § 1343(3) was not even
mentioned.
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any frequency until the late 1960's, when challenges to state administration of federal welfare legislation became common. The
first Social Security cases to be considered by the Supreme
Court involved constitutional claims, with pendent statutory
claims. 16 The Court consistently refused to consider whether
the statutory claim could stand independently. However, most
commentators believed that sections 1343(3) and 1983, stemming
7
from the same legislative act, had to be read as coextensive.'
The real problem centered on which of the provisions was controlling: should section 1983 be read as narrowly as section 1343,
thus ignoring the "and laws" language, or should 1343 be read as
broadly as section 1983, giving no effect to the restrictive words
"any Act... providing for equal rights"? 18

Recent Decisions
In the past year, the Supreme Court has interpreted both
section 1343(3) and section 1983 in a manner that would be surprising to most early commentators. 19 In Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Organization2o the Court decided, after a thor-

ough discussion of the legislative history, that section 1343 jurisdiction was limited to those cases alleging violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or by a federal statute providing for
equal rights.
Having found there was no jurisdiction under section 1343,
the Court reached no decision on the scope of section 1983.21
16. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309 (1968). In King, the Court explicitly avoided deciding whether
"suits challenging AFDC provisions only on the ground that they are inconsistent with the federal statutes may be brought in federal courts." 392 U.S.
at 312 n.2. Rosado, too, left undecided the § 1343(3) question. 397 U.S. at 405
n.7.
17. See, e.g., Cover, EstablishingFederalJurisdictionin Actions Brought
to Vindicate Statutory (Federal) Rights When No Violation of Constitutional Rights are Alleged, 2 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 5, 25 (1969) ("idiotic" to

interpret § 1343(3) and § 1983 differently); Herzer, FederalJurisdictionOver
Statutorily Based Welfare Claims, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8 (1970) (il-

logical to infer historical limitation of § 1983 by restriction of § 1343(3)).
Herzer argues that § 1343 (3) should provide jurisdiction for all § 1983 claims.
18. For a discussion of this dilemma see Note, The Proprietyof Granting
a FederalHearingfor Statutorily Based Actions Under the Reconstruction
Era Civil Rights Acts: Blue v. Craig, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1373-74

(1975).
19. See note 17 supra.

20. 441 U.S. 680 (1979). The Court thoroughly analyzed and rejected two
theories frequently advanced to bring purely statutory claims within the
scope of § 1343: (1) that a state violation of a federal statute is a violation of
the Supremacy Clause, id. at 612-15; and (2) that § 1983 itself is an Act of
Congress providing for equal rights within the meaning of § 1343(3). Id. at
615-20.

21. The case did reveal serious differences of opinion among the Jus-
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However, the future of section 1983 was in serious doubt. Prior
to Chapman, only a few courts held section 1983 inapplicable to
purely statutory claims;22 other courts limited its scope to
claims encompassed by the narrow language of section 1343.23 A
great number of courts, however, found section 1983 applicable
to all federal statutory claims. 24 These cases assumed that all
section 1983 claims were within the jurisdiction of section
1343(3). If the two sections were indeed coextensive, it looked
as if those provisions calling for restriction of the scope of sec26
tion 198325 would prevail.
Then, in Maine v. Thiboutot,27 the Supreme Court held that
section 1983 encompasses all federal statutory as well as constitutional violations. 28 In Thiboutot, plaintiffs were denied certain
welfare benefits by the Maine Department of Human Resources.
They sought review by the state court after exhausting state administrative remedies. Section 1983 was added as a claim in an
amended complaint, and the Thiboutots sought attorney's fees
tices over whether § 1983 encompasses a deprivation of purely statutory
rights. It appeared from the several opinions that four members of the
Court thought § 1983 was available for relief in such cases, and three
thought it was not. Two Justices, members of the majority, gave no opinion
on the scope of § 1983.
22. See, e.g., Wynn v. Indiana State Dep't of Public Welfare, 316 F. Supp.
324, 330-33 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
23. See, e.g., Chase v. McMasters, 573 F.2d 1011, 1017 n.5 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 965 (1978) (relationship between federal government and
Indians embodied in the Indian Organization Act of 1934 has "constitutional
dimension"); McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246, 249-50 (2d Cir. 1969) (Social
Security Act does not provide for equal or civil rights); First Nat'l Bank of
Omaha v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 482 F. Supp. 514, 521-22 (D. Minn. 1979)
(National Bank Act restriction on interest rates not a statute providing for
equal or civil rights).
24. See, e.g., Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830, 835-38 (4th Cir. 1974) (Social Security Act); Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir.
1969) (Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 440 F. Supp. 904,
908-10 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Act of 1970).
25. See generally Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on
the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70
F.R.D. 79 (1976); Tribe, UnravelingNational League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARv.
L. REV. 1065, 1068-69 (1977).
26. The Burger Court has moved steadily toward a more restrictive view
of § 1983. This attitude is consonant with the recent limitations placed on
implied rights of action. See text accompanying notes 38-42 infra. See generally Note, Section 1983 and Federalism: The Burger Court's New Direction, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 904 (1976).
27. 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
28. Id. at 2504. But see Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398
(1980). Just two months before Maine v. Thiboutot, the Court seemed to
view § 1983 as covering only constitutional claims. "[A principal] in the scenario of the § 1983 cause of action [is] the victim of the constitutionaldeprivation. . . ." Id. at 1400 (emphasis added).
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pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976.29
There was no allegation of a constitutional or civil rights violation. The lower court enjoined enforcement of the Maine regulation, but denied attorney's fees. On appeal, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine reversed on the issue of attorney's fees.
The court held that although there was no entitlement under
state law, the Thiboutots were eligible for attorney's fees under
30
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act.
In order to sustain the award of attorney's fees, the United
States Supreme Court first had to consider whether the original
claim was validly brought under section 1983. 31 The Court held
that the phrase "and laws" should be given its plain meaning; it
32
should not be limited to civil rights or equal protection laws.
The Court relied on dicta in several cases which suggested that
section 1983 applied to purely statutory claims. 33 The majority's
discussion of the issue seems to be a "reaffirmation of a statutory interpretation that has been settled authoritatively for
'34
many years.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). See text accompanying notes 116-31 infra.
30. Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230 (Me. 1979).
31. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976 is only applicable to
actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-86, Title IX of Public Law 92-318,
actions by the United States under the Internal Revenue Code, and Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Therefore, if there were no cause of action
under § 1983, there would be no right to attorney's fees.
32. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2504 (1980). The Court found the
legislative history of § 1983 inadequate to prove an intention on the part of
the-drafters to limit its scope. In his dissent, Justice Powell insisted that
reliance on plain meaning was a "flawed premise." Id. at 2510. There is
legislative history which indicates that no substantive change from the
wording of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was intended. See note 9 supra. In
addition, the statute could be read to mean rights secured by both the Constitution and the federal laws. See note 6 supra.
33. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2504 (1980). Each of these cases
involved constitutional as well as statutory claims. The statutory claims
were allowed to go forward, after dismissal of the constitutional claims,
under the Court's pendent jurisdiction. The Court mentions various cases
in which statutory claims under § 1983 were the exclusive cause of action.
Id. at 2504-05. However, as the dissent points out, none of the cases cited
expressly confronted the jurisdictional issue. Id. at 2517. In fact, two cases
decided during the same time period expressly reserved the question
whether § 1983 creates a cause of action for purely statutory claims. See
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 404-05 n.5 (1979);
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 534 n.5 (1974). Even if the unspoken assumption in many of the cases was that § 1983 encompassed statutory claims,
that would not necessarily support the ruling in Maine v. Thiboutot.
"[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions
sub silentio, [the] Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before [it]." Id. at 535 n.5.
34. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2515 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). If the majority is correct in its assertion that the answer was obvious,
and for all practical purposes settled, then a number of courts and commen-

tators have been singularly obtuse. See, e.g., La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 440 F.
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The dissent, however, noted the far-reaching implications of
35
allowing any statutory claim to be brought under section 1983.
Indeed, the states are understandably concerned about the expansion of the scope of section 1983.36 At first glance, it appears
that this decision will dramatically increase the number of suits
filed against the states and their subdivisions.
This Comment will focus on the implications of expanding
section 1983 to encompass purely statutory claims. Thought
must be given to what claims may now be brought under section
1983. Of particular interest is the possibility that section 1983 is
now a viable substitute for implied rights of action.37 Since sections 1983 and 1343 may no longer be viewed as coextensive, the
jurisdictional question must be considered. Finally, the new
role of section 1983 requires reconsideration of the related
problems of immunity, exhaustion of remedies, and attorneys'
fees. These questions will be critical where actions are brought
in state courts.
CLAIMS UNDER SECTION

1983

The decline in the availability of implied rights of action is
well documented.3 8 Initially, four factors were utilized in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute: (1)
whether the plaintiffs are especial beneficiaries of the statute;
(2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent to create
a private remedy; (3) whether a private remedy would further
the policies of the statute; and (4) whether the cause of action is
Supp. 904, 908 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (issue "has yet to be definitively resolved");

Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230, 235 (Me. 1979) (answer "by no means
clear"). See generally Note, Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133, 1169-74 (1977).
35. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2513 (Powell, J., dissenting). The

decision would allow an action to be brought under § 1983 whenever an individual desired to challenge a federal-state cooperative program. The burden of increased litigation would fall unequally on the states, as § 1983
grants no right of action against the United States. Even where an action

against the United States is possible, litigants would be likely to focus on
the state in order to obtain attorney's fees under § 1988.
36. Several states filed amici briefs. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct.
2502, 2506 n.7 (1980). Shortly after the decision was published, states were
so concerned about an onslaught of suits that the National Governor's Association was reportedly contemplating the establishment of a legal defense
fund to help its members. TimE, July 7, 1980, at 72.
37. An implied right of action refers to a private remedy which a court
may find implicit in a statute which does not expressly provide a private
remedy. See text accompanying notes 38-65 infra.
38. See, e.g., Morrison, Rights without Remedies: The Burger Court
Takes the Federal Courts Out of the Business of ProtectingFederal Rights,
30 RUTGERS L. REV. 841 (1977).
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one traditionally relegated to the states. 39 Later decisions further restricted the remedy.40 Recent cases have relied almost
exclusively on congressional intent, 41 and whether express rem42
edies are available under any provision of the act in question.
In contrast, actions brought under section 1983 need not satisfy the criteria necessary for determining an implied right of
action. The question whether a claim under section 1983 may
43
substitute for an implied right of action has been considered,
but was not decided until Maine v. Thiboutot." In discussing
various Social Security Act cases, the Court determined that
section 1983 had to be the exclusive basis for the cause of action
in each instance because the Court had previously 4 5 held that
the Social Security Act affords no private right of action against
a state. 46 Therefore, it would logically follow that section 1983 is
available in cases where an implied right of action would not be.
While the Thiboutot decision demonstrates that section 1983
is not coextensive with, nor dependent upon, the existence of an
implied right of action, it does not indicate under what circumstances a claim under section 1983 is proper. The elements of an
action may be gleaned from prior decisions where constitutional
issues were litigated. First, the action complained of must be a
39. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
40. One case indicates that the implied right of action may be restricted
now to civil rights statutes. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. &Hosp., 612
F.2d 84, 97 n.16 (3d Cir. 1979). Such a view makes little sense since civil
rights statutes either provide their own remedies or would come under
§§ 1983 and 1343(3). This view would make implied rights of action coextensive with already existing remedies.
41. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) ("The central
inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create ... a private cause of
action ... the inquiry ends there. . . ."). For a discussion of this case, and
other recent decisions further restricting implied rights of action, see Comment, Implied Causes of Action: A New Analytical Framework, 14 J. MAR.
L. REV. 141 (1980).
42. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979)
(White, J., dissenting) ("[tihe Court departs from established principles
governing the implication of private rights of action by confusing the inquiry into the existence of a right of action with the question of available
relief.").
43. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 404 n.5
(1979) (reserving question whether suit was maintainable under § 1983 regardless of any private action provided by statute in question).
44. 100 S.Ct. 2502 (1980).
45. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1973).
46. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2504 (1980). In fact, as pointed
out by Justice Powell in his dissent, id. at 2517 n.24, Edelman made no such
holding. An implied right of action was mentioned only in passing by the
majority, and by Justice Marshall in his dissent. Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. at 674, 690. Lower courts still consider the question undecided. See,
e.g., Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638, 646-47 (2d Cir. 1979); Podrazik v. Blum,
479 F. Supp. 182, 187-88 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
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violation of a federally created right.47 Second, the action must
be one taken under color of state law. 48 Each of these require-

ments, and their implications, will be considered in turn.
Most of the statutorily based litigation in recent years has
arisen under the Social Security Act. This statute creates no
"right" to receive public assistance. Instead, it provides for
grants-in-aid, usually matching federal funds, to those states
which have submitted plans for the distribution of these funds.
A common feature of the Act's various portions is a section delineating the elements which must be included in the state plan.
Possible administrative sanctions for failure to comply with the
requirements 49 are also frequently included. A multitude of fed50
eral regulations formulated under the Social Security Act
make strict compliance much more difficult for state administrative agencies. 5 1 Suits have also been based on the Wagner-Peyser National Employment System Act,5 2 the Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act,53 the National
School Lunch Act,5 4 and the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. 55 Each of these Acts involves either

cooperative agreements between federal and state agencies, or
grants-in-aid to state and local agencies.
As society becomes more complex, state and local governments have placed increasing reliance on the federal government for financial support of social programs. Federal-state
interaction is found in all phases of government once tradition47. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) (under § 1983, the first inquiry

is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a federal right).
48. Lorentzen v. Boston College, 440 F. Supp. 464 (D. Mass. 1977),

aff'd, 577 F.2d 720 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924 (1979) (state ac-

tion is essential element of cause of action under § 1983).
49. A good example of such a scheme is the provision for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601, 602, 604 (1970).

The state may not receive funding if a plan has not been submitted and

approved.

50. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 200-99 (1979).

51. Courts have expressed some concern over the implications of judicial enforcement of the Social Security Act. The main concern is that federal courts will become embroiled in a "massive influx" of controversies
best left to state courts. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 555-56 n.4
(1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Additionally, courts are concerned that
the end result will be tantamount to daily supervision of state welfare commissioners. See, e.g., McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1969).
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 49-49n (1970). See Gomez v. Florida State Employment

Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969).
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-38 (1970). See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 440 F. Supp.
904 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-64 (1970). See Stogner v. Page, [1970] Pov. L. REP.
(CCH) 10,928 (N.D. Ml1. 1970).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-81 (1976). See Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 458 F. Supp.

610 (D.R.I. 1978).
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ally within the exclusive province of local government.5 6 It
would seem, then, that the most fertile field for section 1983
claims will be the multitude of statutes which provide some degree of federal funding for state and local use.57 However, any

federal statute which arguably grants a right should not be overlooked. Suits have been brought alleging violation of rights totally unconnected with federal funds. 58 Any of these statutes
will satisfy the requirement that the action complained of be a
violation of a federally created right.
The requirement that action 59 be taken "under color of state
law" is easily met when the defendant is a state or local official
or agency.60 Where the state is involved in some "private" activity, the facts of the individual case must be scrutinized carefully.
61
Mere receipt of state or federal funds by a private institution,
or state regulation, 62 is not sufficient to constitute state action.
The facts must show that the private entity is acting as a state
instrumentality or joint participant, under circumstances indi56. The effects of this modem partnership, and its consequent impact
on federalism, is thoroughly discussed in Note, Developments in the Law:
Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133, 1184-86 (1977).
57. The federal courts have never been loath to adjudicate matters involving state expenditure of federal funds. "When [federal] money is spent
to promote the general welfare, the concept of welfare or the opposite is
shaped by Congress, not the states. .. ." Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397,
422-23 (1970), quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937).
Justice Powell, in his dissent, provided the prospective counsel with a
list of statutes which might be amenable to a § 1983 cause of action. Maine

v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, Appendix, 2519-21 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).

58. See, e.g., Chase v. McMasters, 573 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,

439 U.S. 965 (1978) (Indian Organization Act of 1934); Wirth v. Surles, 562
F.2d 319 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978) (extradition of pris-

oners); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825

(1947) (right to sit on federal juries); Gage v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,

356 F. Supp. 80 (N.D. IIl. 1972) (right to an environmental impact statement
prior to action in which federal agency participates); McGuire v. Amrein,
101 F. Supp. 414 (D. Md. 1951) (federal ban on the tapping of telephones).
59. The word "action" should be read to include failure to act as well as
custom and usage. See, e.g., Mayes v. Elrod, 470 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(continued pattern of inadequate funding resulting in failure to prevent
substandard living conditions in county jail adequately alleged custom

within scope of § 1983); Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)

(state action may be predicated on failure to act).
60. Questions of immunity may arise in some instances. See text accompanying notes 81-102 infra.

61. E.g., Manning v. Greensville Memorial Hosp., 470 F. Supp. 662 (E.D.
Va. 1979) (receipt of Hill-Burton funds does not per se convert actions of
otherwise private hospital to state action).

62. E.g., Wagner v. Sheltz, 471 F. Supp. 903 (D. Conn. 1979) (receipt of

Medicare funds and state regulation did not convert actions of private nursing home to state action).
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cating state control of the private activity. 63 The state action requirement, then, would act as a bar to a section 1983 cause of
action in some of the same situations where, although for different reasons, an implied cause of action is barred.64 Section 1983
can substitute for an implied right of action only in a narrow
range of cases. At least for purposes of federal redress of statutory rights, it appears
that there are indeed some rights which
65
have no remedy.
Where section 1983 does constitute a viable cause of action,
a variety of issues arise. Doctrines developed in the context of
constitutional claims must be reconsidered in the context of
purely statutory claims. Among these related problems are jurisdiction, immunity, exhaustion of remedies, and attorney's
fees.
RELATED PROBLEMS

Jurisdiction
Initially, the section 1983 cause of action was considerably
weakened by separation from jurisdiction under section 1343.
Since the two sections were no longer to be read as coextensive,
it followed that jurisdiction over a purely statutory claim would
be grounded in some other jurisdictional provision, such as section 1331(a), 66 the federal question provision. This section
placed severe limitations on section 1983 claims because the
$10,000 jurisdictional amount had to be satisfied. Welfare litigants and those bringing suit under other federal funding statutes would find it difficult to meet the $10,000 requirement,
particularly since aggregation of individual claims for jurisdictional purposes was barred unless the claims were "common
and undivided. '67 Each member of a class, whether or not a
63. Musso v. Suriano, 586 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1978). See also Ludtke v.

Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).

64. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (The

Court held that there was no implied right of action because there was no
evidence that Congress intended to create a private cause of action. A suit

under § 1983 would be barred because Touche Ross, an accounting firm, was
not acting "under color of state law.").
65. Cf. Arnett v,. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152 (1973) ("[a] substantive
right may [not] be viewed wholly apart from the procedure provided for its
enforcement").
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976). This result was contemplated by the
Court in Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2506 n.6 (1980). The majority
found nothing "inherent[ly] illogic[all in construing section 1983 more
broadly than section 1343(3). . . ." According to the Court, "[ilt would only
mean that there are statutory rights which Congress had decided cannot be

enforced in the federal courts."
67. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969).
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named party, had to satisfy the jurisdictional amount. 68
This restriction of section 1983 raised the question of the
role of state courts in deciding claims based on federal statutory
rights. Section 1983 was originally enacted in reaction to violence unchecked, either willfully or for lack of power, by the
states. 69 The concerns involving the ability of state courts to
cope with violations of fundamental rights to a large extent disappeared. However, the question still remained whether state
courts would be willing, or able, to grant some of the sweeping
changes 70 that federal courts had initiated in response to section
1983 claims. 7 1 With the separation of sections 1983 and 1343,
claims under many federal statutes would be relegated to state
courts unless some substantial constitutional claim were made,
72
or an implied right of action were found.
Five months after the decision in Maine v. Thiboutot, Congress provided a solution to the anomaly of a federal right unenforcible in a federal forum. Section 1331 was amended to
eliminate the jurisdictional amount requirement.7 3 As a result,
68. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1973).
69. The purpose of § 1983 was to provide a federal forum to redress the
violation of federal rights where state authorities were unwilling or unable
to do so. See text accompanying notes 1-8 supra. As late as 1973, this purpose was still recognized as the underlying basis for § 1983. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 426-29 (1973).

70. For example, federal courts in the past have used their injunctive
powers to effect reform of state mental hospitals and prison systems, and to

integrate public schools. See, e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir.
1974) (prison reform); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975),
af'd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976), enforced,
409 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1975), affd sub nom. Morgan v. McDonough, 540
F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976) (school integration); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp.
373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), a~fd in part and remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (reform of state mental hospital).
71. See generally Note, Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133, 1173-87 (1977). The author argues that much
of the opposition to § 1983 claims comes from those who see the section as
destroying the balance between federal and state governments.
72. The problem in bringing these actions in state court is that state
courts might be unwilling, or unable, to effect statewide reforms which have
a dramatic impact on state fiscal policies. For example, in Illinois, despite
the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6001-81 (1976), and the availability of Medicaid funds, smaller, less restrictive facilities are being closed, and their residents transferred to over-

crowded and more restrictive institutions. See Mullen, President'sPage, 68

ILL. B.J. 634 (1980). Responding to criticism of this policy, the Assistant to
the Governor for Human Services cites the demands of funding strategies

and current fiscal problems as complicating the issue. Letter from J.W. Kiley, Assistant to the Governor for Human Services, to Mr. Mullen, President

of the Illinois Bar Association, reprintedin 68 ILL. B.J. 694 (1980). Such con-

flicts in allocation of available funding are common. A state court judge,
well aware of such local problems and controversies, might understandably

hesitate to attempt a solution of the problem by judicial action.
73. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L.
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any federal statutory claim may now be brought without restriction in the federal courts. Section 1983 claims have been
strengthened, and are likely to increase in number as federal
programs proliferate. 74 To some extent, the recent Congressional action will reverse the trend toward limiting the actions
75
federal courts will entertain.
While most section 1983 claims will be brought in federal
courts, it is generally agreed that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction. 76 To date, most of the state court cases have involved section 1983 claims pendent to a state claim. 77 One court
has asserted that, if the claim were the same type as would arise
under state law and be heard in state courts, a state court would
have to enforce the federal claim. 78 Many statutorily based
claims have a state counterpart. For example, the Social Security Act, in its criteria for state plans, requires that the state provide means of enforcement.7 9 Such a plan would normally
provide for administrative remedies, with appeal to the state
court upon exhaustion of the remedies. 80 Since section 1983
claims may arise in either federal or state court, the discussion
of other issues which follows will consider the alternative forums.
No. 96-486 (1980) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)). As amended, § 1331 now
provides that "[t] he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States."
74. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
75. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
76. See, e.g., Brown v. Pitchers, 13 Cal. 3d 518, 531 P.2d 772 (1975). Con-

tra, Chamberlain v. Brown, 442 S.W.2d 248 (Tenn. 1969). The Court in
Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2503 n.1 (1980), purported to have settled
the issue affirmatively in a prior case, citing Martinez v. California, 100 S. Ct.
553 (1980). The Martinez court noted that the California decision on concurrent jurisdiction "appear[ed] to be consistent with the general rule ..
Id. at 558 n.7.
77. A good example is Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230 (Me. 1979). An
action was brought in the state court pursuant to state regulations gov-

erning review of administrative decisions of the state welfare department.
The plaintiffs amended their complaint to include a § 1983 claim, apparently

for the purpose of obtaining attorney's fees under § 1988.
78. See Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis. 2d 475, 254 N.W.2d 704 (1977) (state

courts have affirmative obligation under Constitution of the United States

to assume jurisdiction to hear and decide § 1983 cases whether or not the

federal right asserted is pendent to a state claim).
79. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (4) (1976) (state plan must provide for a fair
hearing before the state agency).
80. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-8.7 (1968) (setting forth procedures for obtaining review, including judicial review of the final administrative decisions). See text accompanying notes 109-11 infra.
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Immunity

Traditionally, in section 1983 cases, immunity and the doctrine of exclusive remedies have precluded successful suits.
The latter bar is still intact, 81 and means that no alternative rem-

edy is available under section 198382 where a particular statute
provides an exclusive remedy for violations. Immunity, on the
other hand, has undergone some changes in the past year, and
may need reevaluation as the incidence of section 1983 claims
increases, 83 especially where the claim arises in a state court.
Immunity may arise in a claim against the state itself or one
of its agencies, a municipality,8 4 or a state officer or employee. A
state may rely on the eleventh amendment 5 as a bar to suits
seeking damages for past actions. 86 This defense is available
even where individual state officials are named as defendants,
so long as the state remains the real party in interest and recovery will be provided from state funds.8 7 However, where the suit
involves prospective injunctive relief, the eleventh amendment
does not preclude relief, even where there would be fiscal conse88
quences to state compliance.
81. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2507 n.11 (1980).
82. E.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 n.5 (1970) (42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a)-(e), Public Accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, provides its own, exclusive remedy); Schatte v. International
Alliance of Theatrical State Employees, 182 F.2d 158, 166 (9th Cir. 1950) (National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68, provides exclusive remedies).
83. See note 84 infra. Under the eleventh amendment, a state may not
be sued by its own residents in federal courts. This doctrine has been extended to state officers acting in their official capacity. The eleventh amendment does not apply to citizens suing the state in state courts, although the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, or a statute limiting state liability, may be a
factor. Most states have waived such immunity in their own courts.
84. Municipalities were originally granted complete immunity, due to
the Court's interpretation of 'person" in § 1983. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 191 (1961). Lower courts began expanding this immunity to include
townships, counties, municipal agencies, states and state agencies. Note,
Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HAv. L REV.
1133,1194-95 (1977). Then, in Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978), the Court expressly overruled Monroe. Subsequently, in Owen
v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980), the Court held that not even
the defense of good faith was open to municipalities. It is likely that other
governmental subdivisions, which derived their immunity from Monroe,
will be similarly liable. See generally Note, Liability of State and Local
Governments Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 92 Hnv. L. REV. 311 (1978).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XI provides: "The Judicial power of the United

States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
86. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
87. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459,
464 (1945).
88. E.g., Graham V.Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (prohibiting denial of
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Although these successful suits involved constitutional
claims, it is doubtful that the application of immunity will
change when purely statutory claims arise in federal courts. In
Maine v. Thiboutot, the Court refused to distinguish between
constitutional and statutory claims for purposes of section 1988,
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act.89 Nor would immunity to
retrospective awards of damages be altered, 90 although in state
courts, unless prohibited by a state constitutional amendment,
the state itself may be named as a defendant. 91
Until recently, municipalities enjoyed even greater immunity to section 1983 suits than did the states. 92 In Monroe v.
Pape,93 the Supreme Court held that municipalities were not included within the word "person" for purposes of a section 1983
claim, thus barring suits against cities. However, after reconsidering the statutory history of section 1983, the Court expressly
overruled Monroe in Monell v. Department of Social Services.94
Furthermore, the Court has now ruled that municipalities may
not even claim good faith immunity. 95 This means that even
where an individual municipal official might claim a personal,
good faith immunity 96 for his actions, recovery may still be had
from municipal funds. One Justice has referred to this as "absolute liability, ' 97 which only municipalities suffer.
welfare funds to otherwise qualified resident aliens); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970) (enjoining termination of welfare benefits without a prior
hearing).
89. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2506 (1980). See text accompanying notes 116-35 infra.

90. In two state decisions, courts have held that states retain the same
immunity that they enjoy in federal courts. Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230
(Me. 1979); Edgar v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 217, 595 P.2d 534 (1979). Thiboutot
limited its decision to welfare claims. 405 A.2d at 237. The Supreme Court
has not ruled on the use of the immunity doctrine in state courts, but has

said that, at least in the context of attorney's fees, "[n]o Eleventh Amendment question is present ... where an action is brought in a state court
since the amendment by its terms, restrains only '[t]he Judicial power of
the United States.'" Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2506 n.7 (1980).
91. This is obvious, as the two cases in note 90 supra indicate. This is
not true, however, in federal courts. In Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978),
the Court ordered Alabama and the Alabama Board of Corrections dismissed as defendants because a "suit against the State and its Board of
Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment; unless Alabama has
consented to the filing of such a suit." Id. at 782.
92. See note 84 supra.
93. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
94. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

95. Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980).
96. See text accompanying notes 98-100 infra.
97. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2513 n.10 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Government officials and employees are another group to
enjoy some measure of immunity. Their immunity is based on
the common law doctrine of personal immunity for official
acts.98 Personal immunity would be irrelevant in most cases asserting a federal statutory right,99 as the relief sought would
more likely be injunctive than for monetary damages. 10 0 Since
the claim against the official would not be a personal claim,
there would be no occasion for the official or employee involved
to assert immunity.
It appears, then, that immunity will continue to bar some
suits based on purely statutory claims. Whether states may continue to successfully assert immunity in state court actions,
where eleventh amendment questions would not arise, still remains unclear. Conversely, it is well settled that state law immunities cannot override a cause of action under section 1983.101
This principle is likely to be upheld in state courts, just as they
have upheld an award of attorney's fees, despite the absence of
10 2
fee provisions under state law.
Exhaustion of Remedies

The Supreme Court has frequently ruled, in the context of
constitutional claims under section 1983, that neither state judicial nor state administrative remedies need be exhausted before
initiating a claim in federal courts. 10 3 Exemption from the general rule requiring exhaustion of remedies 0 4 is consonant with
the underlying purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1871: to avoid
the effects of discriminatory state laws, and inadequate or non98. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1967). For an interesting discussion of the ramifications of personal immunity for judges, see Comment,
Derivative Immunity Under Section 1983: ConspiraciesBetween Immune
Judicial Officials and PrivatePersons, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 89 (1980).

99. This probably would be irrelevant in any case, as public employees

tend to be judgment proof. See Foote, Tort Remediesfor Police Violations of
IndividualRights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493, 514 (1955).

100. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1977) (good faith immunity available in damage actions not available in action seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief); Project Release v. Prevost, 463 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D.
N.Y. 1978) (doctrine of qualified immunity from damages does not prevent
entry of declaratory judgment).
101. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

102. See text accompanying notes 125-26 infra.
103. See, e.g., Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564 (1973); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309 (1968); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
104. The general rule in federal courts is that administrative remedies,

whether state or federal, must first be exhausted. The rationale for this rule
is that questions should be decided by those most competent to do so, and
in the most orderly fashion. Exhaustion of judicial remedies is generally
not required because of the possible res judicata or collateral estoppel effects.
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existent state remedies. 10 5 It would be senseless to require exhaustion of remedies where, by the very nature of the claim, the
remedies are presumptively inadequate. However, now that
section 1983 has been made available to purely statutory claims,
a reevaluation of the exemption policy is necessary, regardless
of whether the claim is presented in a federal or a state forum.
When a section 1983 claim is brought in federal court, exemption from the need to exhaust state judicial remedies is still
a viable doctrine because of the res judicata and collateral estoppel effects. 10 6 Most state administrative remedies would not
have a similar effect. Where no constitutional claim is present,
in which federal courts would have greater expertise, the usual
justification for requiring administrative exhaustion 0 7 is as applicable to section 1983 claims as to any other claim. In those
cases where the Supreme Court has ruled that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required, the remedies available
to the plaintiffs were clearly inadequate. 0 8 Lower courts have
begun to question this exemption from the exhaustion principle, 10 9 and the Supreme Court has indicated that, in the future,
exhaustion will be required where the remedy is adequate." 0
When the issue is a purely statutory claim, and the administrative remedy is adequate, the exhaustion rule is sensible and will
most likely be held applicable.
When section 1983 claims arise in state courts, the administrative exhaustion doctrine is certain to become a problem. Normally, state agencies provide that after a number of internal
appeals are exhausted, resort may be had to the state courts."'
105. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961).
106. Recently, even this doctrine has not been accepted without question. The Supreme Court has been attentive to adequate state judicial remedies. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693 (1976).
107. These justifications include agency expertise, judicial economy, and
consistency in the application of a regulatory scheme. See generally Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases,
41 U. Cm. L. REv. 537 (1974).
108. See Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 841 (1970).
109. The courts are far from uniform in their decisions. Compare Stevenson v. Board of Educ., 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957
(1970)

(administrative remedies must be exhausted) with Simpson v.

Weeks, 570 F.2d 240 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911 (1978) (administrative remedies need not be exhausted).
110. E.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-89 (1973). The Court
would not allow a claim to go forward under § 1983 and avoid the exhaustion
requirement of federal habeas corpus. The same day, in dictum, the Court
indicated that where administrative remedies provided adequate protection
of federal rights, exhaustion might be appropriate. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564, 573-75 (1973).
111. A good example of the process is found in Thiboutot v. State, 405
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The state courts will not accept an appeal until all administrative remedies have been exhausted. 112 Courts have already3
state, rules are applicable to immunity"
ruled that federal, not
114
fees.
attorney's
and
If the same pattern is followed in relation to exhaustion of
remedies, serious problems will arise. Section 1983 claims could
be used to circumvent all of the state rules developed to assure
the orderly administration of state programs. Claimants will
have little incentive to pursue these remedies when an immediate adjudication is available in a state court. Claims which could
have been competently handled administratively will appear in
court before the state executive branch has had any opportunity
to resolve the issue. For this reason alone, the relaxation of the
exhaustion doctrine should be reconsidered. Absent a requirement of exhaustion, courts will become hopelessly overwhelmed
and the costs of administering state programs needlessly in115
creased.
Attorney's Fees

The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act 116 expressly
provides that a court may, in its discretion, allow attorney's fees
to the prevailing party in a section 1983 action. In Hutto v. Finney," 7 the Supreme Court held that the eleventh amendment
did not bar attorney's fees awards in federal courts. The Court
relied on the fact that attorney's fees are part of costs, and costs
A.2d 230, 232 (Me. 1979). Challenging state AFDC requirements, the plain-

tiffs first pursued their administrative remedies through the Commissioner
of the Maine Department of Human Services. Only when a final adverse
administrative decision was rendered were they able to take their appeal to
the Maine state courts.
112. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-8.7 (1968).
113. See text accompanying notes 90-91 supra.
114. See text accompanying note 125 infra.
115. The purpose of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine is two-fold: (1)
to conserve judicial time, which results when the agency grants the relief
sought; and (2) to preserve administrative autonomy by giving the agency
the opportunity to correct its own errors. Smith v. Fenton, 424 F. Supp. 792
(E.D. Ill. 1976). If the agency is allowed to resolve the issue, the likelihood
of resort to judicial determination is reduced. Comment, Exhaustion of
State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. CH. L. REV. 537,

541 (1974).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). The 1976 revision added the following:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985 and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any
civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of
America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United
States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
117. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
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"have traditionally been awarded without regard for the State's
Eleventh Amendment immunity." 118 Hutto, however, left unresolved the questions whether section 1988 is applicable to
purely statutory claims, and whether the rule is applicable in
state courts, notwithstanding state rules to the contrary.
The question of the applicability of section 1988 to statutory
claims was settled in Maine v. Thiboutot."1 9 Relying on the plain
meaning rule, 120 the Court held that "since [section] 1988 makes
no exception for statutory [section] 1983 actions, [section] 1988
plainly aplies [sic] to this suit."'121 The decision is not surprising, considering the wording of section 1988 and Congressional
intent in enacting the provision. The title of section 1988 is misleading. Although it speaks of "Civil Rights," actions to enforce
or to charge a violation of the United States Internal Revenue
Code, clearly not a civil rights statute, are included. Additionally, comments made at the time of enactment indicate that
Congress was well aware of the possibility that section 1983
122
might apply to statutory as well as constitutional claims.
Attorney's fees may also be available where the plaintiff
prevails through settlement rather than litigation. In Maher v.
Gagne,123 the companion case to Maine v. Thiboutot, the Court
held that an award of fees is appropriate where the plaintiff
prevails in a wholly statutory claim pendent to a substantial
constitutional claim. The award is allowed "where both the statutory and the constitutional claim are settled favorably to the
1 24
plaintiff without adjudication."'
State courts have assumed the applicability of section 1988
to actions brought in state courts. 125 The Court confirmed this
118. Id. at 695.
119. 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).

120. When construing a statute, the courts will give words their plain,
ordinary meaning. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978) ("it is
not necessary to look beyond the words of the statute"). But see Lynch v.
Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 549 (1972) (civil rights statutes of the
Reconstruction era "must be given the meaning and sweep [of] . . . their
origins and their language") (emphasis added).

121. 100 S.Ct. at 2506.
122. E.g., 122 CONG. REC. 35122 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Drinan, explain-

ing that § 1983 applies to "[f]ederal statutory as well as constitutional

rights"); id. at 33314 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy, commenting on "rights

promised by Congress or the Constitution"). But see id. at 12159 (remarks
of Rep. Drinan, § 1988 would authorize attorney's fees "in actions brought
under specified sections of the United States Code relating to civil and constitutional rights").

123. 100 S.Ct. 2570 (1980).
124. Id. at 2576.
125. E.g., Tobeluk v. Lind, 589 P.2d 873 (Alaska 1979); Thiboutot v. State,
405 A.2d 230 (Me. 1979); Ramirez v. County of Hudson, 169 N.J. 455, 404 A.2d
1271 (1979); Board of Trustees v. Halso, 584 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. 1978).
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application in Maine v. Thiboutot, noting that no eleventh
amendment question is presented when the action is brought in
a state court 126 since the amendment limits only federal judicial
action. The Thiboutot decision makes a section 1983 action an
attractive alternative to any state remedy. Many state courts
have no authority to include attorney's fees as part of costs without statutory authorization. By bringing an action under section
1983 rather than, or in addition to, applicable state provisions,
state rules can be circumvented
and the cost of pursuing judicial
127
remedies greatly reduced.
It is perhaps this cost factor, rather than the holding that
section 1983 is applicable to statutory claims, that so concerns
the states. 128 If claims can be successfully adjudicated at no
cost to the plaintiffs, it is likely that the incidence of such claims
will increase. The cost to the state of defending claims will dramatically increase, further burdening overstrained state budgets. There is already some indication that section 1983 claims
129
are being appended to other claims in order to obtain fees.
Given the liberality of pendent jurisdiction, an experienced attorney might find numerous ways to obtain fees against a state
13 0
defendant.
The criteria for the award of attorney's fees where the claim
is purely statutory are yet undecided. Where constitutional
claims are involved, the Supreme Court has held that, barring
126. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2506 n.7 (1980). The holdings here
and in Maher v. Gagne, 100 S. Ct. 2570 (1980), are somewhat confusing as to
what the Court has considered in regard to attorney's fees. Between the
two decisions, the Court has held that fees are available when the party
prevails through litigation in a state court, whether the claim is statutorily
or constitutionally based, and where the party prevails in a federal court
through settlement of both a statutory and a substantial constitutional
claim. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), decided that attorney's fees are
available in federal court on constitutional claims. Whether fees are available in federal court on a purely statutory claim is still undecided. The decision in Maine v. Thiboutot, however, appears broad enough to cover the
issue. 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2507 (1980) (fee provision is part of § 1983 remedy in
federal or state court).
127. The Court indicates that the allowance of fees in state courts is necessitated by the recent split of §§ 1983 and 1343(3). See Maine v. Thiboutot,
100 S. Ct. 2502, 2507 n.12 (1980).
128. See note 36 supra.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 595 F.2d 525, 529
(9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Bryant v. Yellen, 100 S. Ct.
2232 (1980); Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230 (Me. 1979).
130. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2514 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting), citing Wolf, Pendent Jurisdiction,Multi-Claim Litigation and the
1976 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 2 W. NEw ENG. L REv. 193,
249 (1979).
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unusual circumstances, fees should ordinarily be awarded. 13 1
One court has undertaken the task of listing factors entitled to
consideration in determining the appropriate amount of the
award, 132 but this case again dealt with a constitutional claim.
The standards for setting the amount of the award are broad
enough to be applicable to statutorily based claims. 133 However,
the standard employed for determining whether a fee should be
awarded at all may be overly broad. The Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Act was intended to be more moderate than statutes requiring the awarding of fees. 134 Where the claim is based on a
statute, an appropriate inquiry might be whether correction of
the state rule in question would benefit others in addition to the
plaintiff, and whether issues of public policy are served by the
litigation. 35 These questions are appropriate in dealing with
state regulatory schemes, and they further the purpose of the
Act without unduly burdening individual plaintiffs. Most regulations, by their very nature, would affect a wide class of potential
plaintiffs, thus satisfying the suggested criteria.
CONCLUSION

Since the Supreme Court has separated section 1983 from
section 1343, long considered its jurisdictional counterpart, consideration must be given to the new role that section 1983 will
play in relation to federal statutory claims. Section 1983 has
some potential as a substitute for an implied right of action. Recent decisions have further narrowed the situations in which a
statute gives rise to an implied right of action, while section 1983
is available for any statutory claim. However, since section 1983
is limited to state action, or action taken under color of state law,
131. E.g., Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973); Newman v.

Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
132. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th
Cir. 1974). The suggested factors include: (1) time and labor actually required; (2) novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) skill requisite to
proper performance of the legal service; (4) preemption of the attorney's
time; (5) the amount involved and the results obtained; (6) the experience,
reputation and ability of the attorneys; (7) the "undesirability" of the case;
(8) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
and (9) awards in similar cases. Exhaustive discussion of these factors is
found in Comment, Calculation of a Reasonable Award of Attorneys' Fees
Under the Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 13 J. MAR.L. REV. 331 (1980).
133. See note 132 supra. There is nothing in these factors which would

limit their use to cases involving constitutional claims.
134. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 708 n.7 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Act does not require "routine imposi-

tion" of fees).

135. See Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230, 240 (Me. 1979).
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its usefulness as a substitute for an implied right of action will
be limited.
Despite some limitations, the courts are likely to experience
an increase in section 1983 claims. Not only may purely statutory claims be brought, but recent changes in jurisdictional requirements will further facilitate suits. The abolition of the
$10,000 requirement in federal question cases will enable claimants under such statutes as the Social Security Act to bring suit
in the federal courts. State courts, too, will face section 1983
claims, although usually pendent to state claims.
Two important considerations will be the doctrines of immunity and exhaustion of remedies. Many of the immunity considerations which were developed in federal courts remain
unchanged. However, in state courts the eleventh amendment
does not bar suits in which states or state agencies are named as
parties defendant. 136 The various state courts which have considered the issue are inclined to maintain the distinction between prospective and retrospective relief established by
federal courts. The distinction is likely to continue, as state
courts will not wish to further burden state budgets by requiring
retroactive payments under such statutes as the Social Security
Act. The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, on the other hand,
must be altered to comport with the new role of section 1983.
Claimants should not be allowed to bypass state administrative
remedies where a claim under state regulations would require
such exhaustion.
Finally, statutory 1983 claims will prove most useful in the
area of attorney's fees. The availability of fees will encourage
challenges to state and local agencies' rules and regulations. An
increase in the number of statutory 1983 claims may induce a
change in the standards upon which courts base the discretionary award of fees. Any change, however, must not be allowed to
unduly burden claimants, thus undermining Congress' purpose
in enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act. Some
claimants will bring their actions in state courts, and Congress
intended that plaintiffs should not face financial burdens in asserting claims of violations of federal rights.
Diane I. Jennings

136. See notes 83 and 90 supra.

